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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 1949-1971
By P. W. HOGG*
Scope of Study
This article reports the results of a reading of all the administrative
law cases decided in the Supreme Court of Canada and reported in the
Supreme Court Reports from 1949 to 1971 inclusive.'
My definition of an "administrative law case" was a case in which the
decision of an official or agency purporting to act under statutory authority
was under review. In the term "review" I included statutory appeals as well
as the prerogative writs, actions for declarations or injunctions, the various
forms of collateral attack, and statutory applications to quash. I confined the
cases to those in which decisions made or purporting to be made under statu-
tory authority were under review. I would also have included cases in which
decisions made under prerogative power were under review, but there were
none of those. However, I excluded cases in which decisions made under essen-
tially consensual authority, such as private arbitration awards or decisions of
voluntary associations, were under review. I also excluded cases where,
although the decision of an agency was technically under review, the Court's
decision was completely devoted to the substantive law of taxation, assessment,
expropriation, patents or some other field. In these excluded cases no issue
concerning judicial review was presented. For the same reason cases completely
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1My colleague, Professor Paul C. Weiler, has written several such studies: The
Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of Mens Rea (1971), 49 Can. B. R. 280;
Groping Towards a Canadian Tort Law: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada (1971),
21 U. of T. L. J. 267; The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 1; he has also prepared a study of the constitutional law cases for publication
in the U. of T. L.J.
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devoted to constitutional issues were excluded. Finally, I excluded the cases
reviewing the decisions of labour relations boards. This was not because they
do not fit my definition - they do - but because they form part of a study
of labour relations cases in the Supreme Court of Canada which has been
published by Professor Paul C. Weiler.2 There seemed no point in simply
duplicating the work reported in Weiler's admirable study. However, where a
labour board case seemed especially important, or where my results would be
distorted or misleading by reason of the exclusion of labour board cases, I
have made reference to them; the result is that they are quite frequently
referred to.
Role of Court
Before starting an analysis of the decisions it is appropriate that I should
disclose my own views as to the proper scope of judicial review of admin-
istrative action. My views are set out in detail in another article,3 and I shall
simply summarize that article here.
I start with the undeniable proposition that judicial review inevitably
involves extra delay, extra expense, and the duplication of effort. These costs
should be born only if there is a strong likelihood of improvement in the
quality of decision. If there is no strong likelihood of improvement in the
quality of decision, then the administrative decision should be treated as
conclusive.
When an agency has made findings of fact, law or policy which need
to be made in order to reach a decision, then those findings should normally
be treated as conclusive. There are two reasons for this. The first, a functional
one, is that the court has less experience with the regulated area and less
knowledge and understanding of it. Just as in medicine the general practitioner
will not presume to overrule the specialist in his area of competence, so the
generalist court should not overrule the specialist agency within its area of
competence. The overwhelming majority of agency decisions, therefore, should
be treated as conclusive. There is no strong likelihood of a better decision
on the part of the court. This is so, in my view, even where the error allegedly
made by the agency can be classified as one of "law". The reports contain a
number of decisions in the labour relations area where the court has overruled
the agency on what appeared to be a pure question of law, and unwittingly
disturbed longstanding and rational expectations and practices of both the
agency and those regulated by its decisions.4 A ruling of "law" tends to be a
compound of law, fact and policy, lying peculiarly within the competence of
2p. C. Weiler, The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 1.
3 P. W. Hogg, Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need? (1972), a public lecture,
unpublished at the time of writing.
4 The most recent case is Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, [1970] S.C.R. 425; criticized by J. G. Norwood, Comment (1970),
28 U. of T. Fac. L.R. 109; J. N. Lyon, Comment (1971), 49 Can. Bar Rev. 365; P. W. Hogg,
The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 203 at 212; P. C. Weiler, supra, note 2 at 30. Weiler's article, which has been
referred to earlier in the text, is a study of all the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions
in the labour relations field since 1950.
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the agency. The less well-informed court should defer to the agency. The
second reason why the courts should defer to agency findings of fact, law or
policy is more fundamental. A decision made by an agency within its statutory
powers should be treated as conclusive because the power of decision was
granted by the legislature to the agency, and not to the court. Thus, whether
we speak in functional terms, and emphasize the comparative qualifications
of court and agency, or whether we speak in constitutional terms, and em-
phasize the mandate granted by -the elected legislature, we reach the same
conclusion: there is an area within which agency action should be unreviewable.
There is however a need for judicial review. The very characteristics
which make the agency well qualified within its area of specialization may lead
it to overlook or underestimate general values which are fundamental to the
legal order as a whole. The generalist court is ideally suited to check the
specialist agency at the point where these values are threatened. Furthermore,
in deciding controversies between the State or its officials and the individual,
the court offers as good a guarantee of neutrality as it is reasonable to expect
in an imperfect world: the judges enjoy high social standing, security of tenure
and a long tradition of independence.
In Chaput v. Romain5 police broke up an assembly of Jehovah's Witnesses
who were meeting peacefully in a private house. In Lamb v. Benoit6 police
arrested a Jehovah's Witness, held her for a weekend without charging her, then
laid some baseless charges against her. In Roncarelli v. Duplessis7 the Premier
of Quebec ordered the cancellation of a Jehovah's Witness' liquor licence. In
each case the official action was taken without any legal authority. In each
case the Supreme Court of Canada held the action to be invalid, and awarded
redress to the injured citizen.
It is essential to any civilized community that official action be authorized
by law. In a democratic community the requirement of legal validity has
special significance in that the laws which must authorize official action must
be enacted by a freely elected legislature. Every exercise of power must therefore
have a democratic root. What the Supreme Court did in the three Jehovah's
Witnesses cases was to insist on the democratic character of the Quebec govern-
ment. No institution other than the courts was as well suited to identify the
democratic value which was involved, and no other institution had the strength
to insist upon the supremacy of that value.
The Jehovah's Witnesses cases are unusual in that the defendants were
unable to point to any statute which authorized their actions. Much more
frequent are the cases where an official or agency has acted in the conscientious
belief that his statutory powers authorize what he has done. When the official
act is challenged, the judicial duty is to interpret the statute and see whether
it really does give power to do the very thing complained of. But this duty, in
my view, should be exercised with restraint. Where the statute will reasonably
bear the meaning which its administrator has placed upon it, the court should
not substitute a different meaning. The agency's interpretation of the empower-
5 [1955] S.C.R. 834.
6 [1959] S.C.R. 321.
7 [1959] S.C.R. 121.
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ing statute is likely to be well-informed as to the policy of the statute and as
to the needs of effective government. It should not be lightly overridden.
There are cases, however, where the agency view must be overridden.
The agency may have adopted a distorted position which takes insufficient
account of values which are fundamental to the legal order as a whole. The
generalist court should check the specialist agency at the point where these
general values are threatened. In deciding whether an agency's interpretation
of its powers is "reasonable", the court must therefore weigh the official
perception of the needs of effective government against the general values of
civil liberty which are asserted by the individual affected. The more serious
the effect on the individual the narrower will be the range of reasonable inter-
pretations of the statute. In Beatty v. Kozak,8 for example, Saskatchewan's
Mental Hygiene Act gave power to the police to arrest a person "apparently
mentally ill" if that person was "conducting himself in a manner which in a
normal person would be disorderly". The plaintiff was arrested while working
peacefully in her office, and was detained for 44 days. The majority of the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not at the time of her arrest "con-
ducting [herself] in a manner-which in a normal person would be disorderly".
Rand J. dissented from this decision. He held that the statute could be inter-
preted as justifying arrest on the basis of past persistent disorderly conduct.
Since this was the interpretation which the administrators of the statute (the
police) had placed upon it, and since this interpretation was reasonable
(according to Rand J.), he held that the Court should not substitute its view.
It seems to me that Rand J.'s approach to the question is preferable to
that of the majority, in that the majority assumed a single "correct" meaning
of the statute. To ask whether the administrative interpretation is "reason-
able" seems to me to be a better approach, since it acknowledges the
administrator as having a contribution to make to the question. But in the
actual result of the case I side with the majority. The plaintiff, it will be recalled,
had been denied her personal liberty for 44 days. In interpreting a statute
which confers a power of this order the court must weigh the claim to personal
liberty against the claim to effective government. The police interpretation of
the power was not absurd, but it did strain the statutory language. The Court
was justified in insisting that a serious invasion of a fundamental civil liberty
should be authorized by relatively clear language. (It may be possible to
support the dissenting view on the basis that there was a privative clause in
the statute; the privative clause would justify greater judicial restraint.)9
There is even scope for judicial review in some cases where the agency
decision is authorized by a literal reading of the empowering statute. In Smith
and Rhuland Ltd. v. The Queen 0 the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board
refused certification to a union which had established the requisite support
among the employees in the bargaining unit. The Board's refusal to certify
the union was based on the ground that the union was dominated by an
official who was a communist. The Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority,
8 [1958] S.C.R. 177.
9 See text accompanying note 47, infra.
10 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95.
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quashed the decision. Rand J.'s majority opinion agreed that the Board had a
discretion whether or not to certify a union which enjoyed the support of a
sufficient number of employees in the bargaining unit. But that discretion
was not unfettered. It was not open to the Board to "act upon the view that
official association with an individual holding political views considered to be
dangerous by the Board proscribes a labour organization". 1 ' An exercise of
discretion on that ground was outside the empowering statute and invalid.
Can this result be accommodated within a philosophy of judicial review
which emphasizes restraint on the part of the courts? After all, the Labour
Board had made a considered determination upon what was essentially a
question of labour relations policy. Were the three dissenting judges right in
refusing to intervene? I believe that the majority decision was the better one.
In this case the Board's policy collided with a general value of the highest
importance to the Canadian democratic legal order, namely, the freedom of
association. This value had to be weighed in the balance with the agency's
perception of its policy. In rejecting that policy the court was insisting that
such a serious invasion of democratic and civil libertarian values be rather
clearly authorized by the empowering statute. The generalist court was
reminding the specialist agency that the agency was not "an island entire of
itself", and that its work had to be brought "into harmony with the totality
of the law". 1
2
The tension between the agency's claim to carry out the legislative
mandate in its own way, and the court's claim to protect the integrity of the
system as a whole, is what makes administrative law so difficult. I have
attempted elsewhere to elaborate this theme,' 3 and of course it will run
through the rest of this article.
Voting Patterns
The number of cases with which I was left after the various exclusions
reported at the beginning of this article was 71. The period of study, 1949 to
1971, comprised 23 years, so that there was an average of only three (3.09
to be precise) reported administrative law cases decided in the Supreme Court
of Canada in each year. If the 29 reported cases reviewing labour board
decisions14 are added, the total rises to 100 (exactly) and the yearly average
to a little over four (4.35). It is fair to conclude that administrative law is
not a major part of the Court's work; certainly the Court decides many more
cases in each of the areas of taxation, criminal law and torts.15
11 Id., at 100. Rand J.'s opinion was concurred in by Kerwin and Estey JJ. Kellock J.
concurred in the result, but on the ground that the Board had no discretion, i.e., it was
under a duty to certify any union which satisfied the express statutory requirements for
certification. Taschereau, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. dissented on the ground that the
Board had validly exercised its discretion.
12 L. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965)
at 590.
13 P. W. Hogg, supra, note 3.
14p. C. Weiler, supra, note 2, included 27 decisions in his study of the period 1950
to 1970, to which must be added any decisions in 1949 (none) and 1971 (two).
15 See, e.g., Statistical Analysis of [1964] S.C.R. (1965), 3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
445; Statistical Analysis of [1969] S.C.R. (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 622.
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The numbers are probably too small to treat the variations in different
classes as significant. However, it is interesting that the rate of review of
decisions made under federal statutes (15 out of 32) is higher than the rate
of review of decisions made under provincial statutes (28 out of 68). The
figures offer no support for a thesis that a federally-appointed court would
favour federal agencies. The labour board figures are also interesting in
that they display a lower rate of review than the average. There has been
considerable criticism of judicial intervention in the labour field,16 and I have
argued elsewhere that the court has intervened in a number of cases where
it should have sustained the labour board.17 But the figures as a whole do
not suggest a court which is anxious to upset labour board determinations.18
If the overall picture of the results suggests restraint, there is nevertheless
considerable variation in the voting patterns of the individual judges. The
100 decisions of the court included 69 in which the members were unanimous
and 31 in which the members were divided.
Unanimous decisions
Agency sustained 41
Agency reversed 28 69
Divided decisions
Agency sustained 16
Agency reversed 15 31
The judge who voted most consistently in favour of the agency was
Abbott I. He participated in 18 divided decisions and voted to sustain the
agency in 15. Judson J.'s voting pattern was similar; he participated in 14
divided decisions and voted to sustain the agency in 11. The other judges
who cast a majority of their votes in divided cases in favour of the agency
were Taschereau J. (11-5), Kerwin J. (10-5), Ritchie J. (5-4) and Pigeon J.
(2-1). At the other end of the spectrum, Spence J. participated in 9 divided
decisions and voted to sustain the agency in only 2. Locke J. (3-8), Martland
J. (5-9), Cartwright 1. (8-14), Rand J. (6-8), Fauteux J. (7-9), Kellock J.
(3-4), Hall J. (4-5) and Laskin J. (0-1) also cast a majority of their votes in
divided cases against the agency. The voting of Estey J. (3-3) and Rinfret J.
(2-2) was evenly divided.
Plural Remedies
The cases which comprised the study entered the court system in a great
variety of ways. Here are the figures:
Prerogative writs (or orders):
Mandamus alone 9
Mandamus with certiorari in aid 1
Prohibition alone 2
Certiorari alone 6
16 p. C. Weiler, supra, note 2, is the latest article.
17 p. W. Hogg, supra, note 4 at 212.
I8Accord, P. C. Weiler, supra, note 2 at 9.
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Certiorari with a statutory appeal 1
Habeas corpus alone 1
Habeas corpus with certiorari in aid 4
Civil actions:
Declaration alone 7
Declaration with injunction or damages 2
Injunction alone 3
Injunction with declaration and damages 1
Damages alone 7
Damages with declaration or injunction 2
Money had and received 1
Recovery of documents 1
Criminal prosecutions:
For breach of by-law 2
Statutory proceedings:
Appeal alone 17
Appeal with certiorari 1
Reference by agency 1
Application to quash by-law 4
Application to set aside default judgment 1
The variety of proceedings reflects the fact that the validity of official
acuon may become a relevant issue in almost any kind of proceedings.
Plurality of remedies will never be entirely corrected; or at least not until
some legislature is bold enough (and skillful enough) to prohibit even collateral
attack (e.g., in a tort action or criminal prosecution). But the need to choose
between the various prerogative writs, declaration, injunction and statutory
remedies is a completely unnecessary complexity in the law of judicial review.
The plurality of remedies is now starting to receive legislative attention,
notably in Ontario's Judicial Review Procedure Act.19 But the cases in my
study, which end with the 1971 volume of the Supreme Court Reports, all
precede any such reform.
According to Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, whose views have become
dogma in the law schools of the common law world, much judicial time is
consumed in the resolution of the sterile question as to which of the plural
remedies is appropriate; and, as the result, a "myriad of cases fail to reach
the merits". 20 The cases in my survey show that these criticisms do not apply
to the Supreme Court of Canada. Only one case out of the 71 failed to reach
the merits because the court held that the wrong remedy had been chosen. In
that case, Masella v. Langlais,21 habeas corpus had been selected to attack
a deportation order made against an alien who was no longer in custody.
Locke J. in careful scholarly opinion concluded that habeas corpus was not
available; the appropriate remedy was certiorari. He did not address himself
19 S. 0. 1971, c. 48. See also Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-71, c. 1.
20 Kennetih C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1958) at
section 24.01.
21 [1955] S.C.R. 263.
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to the merits at all. Even here, however, where the error of selection was both
serious and obvious, two of the five judges (Taschereau and Abbott JJ.) ignored
the remedial point and decided against the applicant on the merits.2-
One "cardinal principle" of judicial review which Davis rightly condemned
is that which "denies one method of review when another is adequate".
23 It is
safe to say that this principle has no place in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of Canada. There is not one case in the study in which the Court denied
an otherwise appropriate remedy on the ground that another remedy would
be more or equally appropriate. The court was invited in King v. University
of Saskatchewan24 to hold that mandamus should not be granted against a
university where there was statutory provision for a "visitor" with power to
redress the grievance; the argument was rejected, although mandamus was
in fact denied on the merits. In City of Ottawa v. Boyd Builders Ltd.
5
counsel for the city argued that mandamus should not be granted for the
purpose of attacking a municipal by-law, where there was statutory provision
for an application to quash the by-law; the Court rejected this argument and
awarded mandamus. The same argument was made in Wiswell v. Metropolitan
Corporation of Greater Winnipeg26 against the award of a declaration to quash
the by-law; again the argument was rejected and the declaration granted.
In Wiswell the action for the declaration had been brought outside a three-
month limitation period which applied to the statutory application to quash,
so that the effect of the Court's decision was to evade the limitation period.
7
There has been controversy in Canada and elsewhere in the common law
world as to whether the remedy of declaration, especially when claimed by
itself, is available for the review of official action.28 Commentators have pointed
out that the declaration offers significant advantages over the prerogative writs
as a tool of review. 29 And yet, while the availability of declaration seems now
to be well-established in England, 30 courts elsewhere have been strangely
cautious and conservative; they have been reluctant to allow a newcomer to
supplant the prerogative writs. In Hollinger Bus Lines Ltd. v. Ontario Labour
Relations Board3' the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the remedy of
declaration could not be employed when one of the prerogative writs would
22 Cartwright J. agreed with Locke J., but added a short opinion of his own to the
effect that he would have been prepared to quash the order if the proceedings had been
properly brought. The remaining judge, Fauteux" J., agreed with both Locke and Cart-
wright JJ.
23 K. C. Davis, supra, note 20 at section 24.01.
24 [1969] S.C.R. 678.
25 [1965] S.C.R. 408.
26 [1965] S.C.R. 512.
27 The same result was reached in Tonks v. Reid, [1967] S.C.R. 81.
28 R. F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) at
363-66.
29 G. J. Borrie, The Advantages of the Declaratory Judgment in Administrative Law
(1955), 18 Mod. L. Rev. 138; 1. Zamir, The Declaratory Judgment v. The Prerogative
Orders [1958] Public Law 341; D. T. Warren, The Declaratory Judgment: Reviewing
Administrative Action (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 610.
3OAnisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (H.L.).
31 [1952] O.R. 366.
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be appropriate. There is a similar decision in the High Court of Australia.32
The reader who confined himself to the cases in the study would be entirely
unaware of the existence of any controversy as to the availability of declara-
tion as a method of judicial review. No trace of it appears in any opinion in
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court has often heard actions for declara-
tions where the sole purpose was to secure review of an official decision, 33
and it has never doubted that the remedy of declaration is available as a
substitute for a prerogative writ.
34
The Supreme Court's refusal to decide cases on technical procedural
grounds 35 is wholly praiseworthy. Less praiseworthy, however, is the Court's
refusal ever to discuss in general terms the procedural points which are urged
before it. Thus, while it is possible to predict on the basis of the Court's actual
decisions that the availability-of-alternative-remedy argument is not likely to
succeed in the Supreme Court of Canada, we search in vain for a general
statement expressly rejecting the doctrine or defining the scope of the doctrine.
Presumably, therefore, the argument will continue to be urged before lower
courts, and they will have difficulty in deciding how to deal with it. It would
surely be desirable for the Supreme Court to generalize from its actual practice
and to lay down a rule that the availability of an alternative remedy is not a
sufficient ground for the refusal of an otherwise appropriate remedy. To that
rule there would need to be at least this exception (although it is not recog-
nized in any of the cases in the study): where a statutory remedy is available,
and the statute providing for that remedy makes the remedy exclusive, then
other remedies are not available.36 This suggested exception to the general
rule takes us into consideration of privative clauses, a topic which is treated
next in this article.
Privative Clauses
Privative clauses are clauses in statutes which purport to exclude judicial
32 Toowoomba Foundry Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia (1945), 71 C. L.R.
545 (H.C. of A.); criticized, P. Brett and P. W. Hogg, Cases and Materials on Administra-
tive Law (2nd ed. Melbourne: Butterworths, 1967) at 173.
33 Henderson v. Johnston, [1959] S.C.R. 655; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. A.-G.
Can., [1962] S.C.R. 729; Township of North York v. Metropolitan Toronto, [1965]
S.C.R. 401; Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [19651
S.C.R. 512; The Queen v. Randolph, [1966] S.C.R. 260; Tonks v. Reid, [1967] S.C.R. 81;
Jones and Maheux v. Gamache, [1969] S.C.R. 119; Baldwin v. Pouliot, [1969] S.C.R. 577.
34 The discussion of the availability of the remedy by Fauteux J. in Jones and Maheux
v. Gamache, [1969] S.C.R. 119 at 129 is not primarily directed to this fundamental
question, although there are allusions to it. The availability of declaration in Quebec is
more limited than in the common law provinces: [1969] S.C.R. 119 at 130.
35 The labour cases do include a case deciding a procedural controversy: as to
whether certiorari will lie to quash the award of an arbitration board appointed under a
collective agreement. The court did examine the question, and it decided that the board
could be characterized as a statutory tribunal so as to make certiorari available. The
court then went on to decide that the award should be quashed: Port Arthur Shipbuilding
Co. v. Arthurs, [1969] S.C.R. 85. This decision is discussed by P. C. Weiler, supra, note
2 at 63.
36 See now Pringle v. Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821, outside the period studied.
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review. They include the "finality clause" (which declares an agency decision
to be final), the "exclusive jurisdiction clause" (which is a kind of finality
clause), the "no-certiorari clause" (which expressly protects the agency decision
from review by certiorari and other named remedies), and even notice or
limitation clauses (which exclude review unless prior notice has been given
or unless proceedings are brought within a short time).
The treatment of privative clauses by the courts has long been the despair
of academic commentators. Particularly notorious are the cases reviewing the
decisions of labour relations boards, where the Supreme Court of Canada has
consistently refused to give any effect to strongly-worded privative clauses.37
In my study the immigration cases present a similar picture. Up until 1967,
when the Immigration Appeal Board was established, together with a right
of appeal from the Board to the Supreme Court, there was a privative clause
in the immigration legislation.38 Between 1949 and 1967 there were eight
cases in which the decisions of immigration officials were under attack, and
in three of them the attack was successful. In one case the existence of the
privative clause was noted and quickly dismissed.3 9 In none of the remaining
seven cases was the clause even mentioned, let alone discussed.
There is of course an argument of statutory interpretation in favour of the
judicial refusal to give effect to privative clauses. It is said that, if the clause
protects a "decision", then a decision made outside or in excess of jurisdiction
is no decision. This argument, or some variant thereof, will apply to almost
any form of privative clause.40 What makes the argument implausible, to say the
least, is the fact that only decisions outside or in excess of "jurisdiction" (in
the broad sense of that term) are reviewable anyway: the argument assumes
37See H. Sutherland, Comment, (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev. 69; B. Laskin, Certiorari
to Labour Boards: The Apparent Futility of Privative Clauses (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev.
986; J. G. Pink, Judicial "Jurisdiction" in the Presence of Privative Clauses (1965), 23
U. of T. Fac. L. R. 5; K. Norman, The Privative Clause: Virile or Futile? (1969), 34
Sask. L. Rev. 334. Cf. R. Carter, The Apparent Virility of Privative Clauses (1967),
U. B. C. L. Rev. - C. de D. (joint centennial issue) 219, who argues that the clauses
have had some effect.
38 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 93, s. 23; R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, s. 39. This provision
was repealed in 1967 when the Immigration Appeal Board was established: Immigration
Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 90, s. 30 and see ss. 22, 23 (see now R.S.C. 1970,
c. I-3, ss. 22,23).
39 A.-G. Can. v. Brent, [1956] S.C.R. 318 at 321.
40 J. G. Pink, supra, note 37 at 14, suggests that better drafting, and in particular
explicit denial of jurisdictional error as a ground of review, "could virtually eliminate
judicial review". He cited R. ex. rel. Sewell v. Morrell, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 710. He might
well have added the Australian case of R. v. Commissioner of Police for the Northern
Territory; Ex parte Holroyd (1965), 7 F.L.R. 8. But it seems doubtful that Pink's view
would prevail, for it assumes that clearer language will somehow overcome the institutional
jealousy and the competing democratic and civil libertarian values which have so per-
sistently led the courts to circumvent privative clauses: see B. Laskin, supra, note 37 at 990.
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that the legislature has enacted a provision which could never, under any
circumstances, have any work to do.41
Professor Bora Laskin, writing in 1952, argued for a different approach
to privative clauses. He argued that the purpose of a privative clause was to
exclude all judicial review, and that it should be interpreted as doing just
that.42 This theory is attractive, but its simplicity is as deceptive as that of
the theory which has been accepted by the courts. If it is unrealistic to inter-
pret privative clauses as excluding no judicial review, it is almost equally
unrealistic to interpret them as excluding all judicial review. The latter inter-
pretation gives too little weight to the democratic and civil libertarian values
with which agency action occasionally comes into conflict. If an official or
agency acts without a shadow of legal justification, should the courts deny
redress because of the existence of a privative clause? If an official or agency
acts in violation of fundamental civil liberties, should the courts deny redress
because of the existence of a privative clause? These kinds of cases are rare,
but they do occur from time to time. The trilogy of Quebec cases litigated by
Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1950's, which have already been mentioned43
and which are discussed below,44 are examples. I believe that the courts
properly granted redress in those cases, despite the existence of privative
clauses. There is no need to fall into the all-or-nothing fallacy and interpret
the general language of a privative clause as denying the power to grant
redress even in exceptional cases.
There have been intermittent indications that the Supreme Court of
Canada, influenced perhaps by Laskin's article, is moving away from the old
simplistic view which in effect robbed privative clauses of any efficacy at all.
In several cases in which an official decision has been attacked in a tort action
for damages brought against the official who made the decision, a privative
clause has featured prominently. The privative clause has not been ignored
by any means, although it has only once been held effective. The one case is
The Queen v. Randolph,45 where the Crown was sued for damages for an
allegedly illegal suspension of the petitioner's mail service. The Court held
that the suspension of service was intra vires and therefore not actionable.
This was sufficient to decide the case, but the Court added that a provision
in the Post Office Act which stated that neither the Crown nor the Postmaster
General was "liable to any person for any claim arising from the loss, delay
41 This is a slight exaggeration in that it is now orthodox doctrine that the standard
no-certiorari clause will exclude review for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face
of the record: see R. Carter, supra, note 37; K. Norman, supra, note 37. But this ground of
review is available only on certiorari, not on any of the other common law or equitable
remedies. Moreover, it is not difficult for the court which desires to review to treat an
error of law as one which amounts to a jurisdictional error. It may be noted here too
that review for breach of natural justice is available in the face of a privative clause:
Board of Health (Salifleet Township) v. Knapman, [1956] S.C.R. 877.
42 B. Laskin, supra, note 37.
43 See text accompanying notes 5, 6 and 7, supra.
44 See text accompanying notes 51 to 63, infra.
45 [1966] S.C.R. 260.
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or mishandling of anything deposited in a post office" would also preclude any
action for damages.'4
Beatty v. Kozak,47 discussed earlier in this article, was an action for false
imprisonment brought against a police officer and police matron who without
legal authority had arrested the plaintiff and had her detained in mental hos-
pitals for 44 days. The defendants relied upon two privative clauses in the
Mental Hygiene Act. The first clause prohibited proceedings against anyone
who detained a mentally ill person, "if the person so acting has acted in good
faith and with reasonable care". The Court held this clause inapplicable,
because the defendants had not acted "in good faith and with reasonable
care". The second clause imposed a six-month limitation period upon "pro-
ceedings against any person for anything done or omitted to be done in pur-
suance of this Act." (The plaintiff's action had not been commenced in time.)
The Court held that this clause did not protect the defendants either, because
in order to obtain its protection the defendants had to show at least that they
had a "bona fide belief in facts which, if they existed, would have afforded
a justification under the statute". 48 It is significant that neither of the two
majority judgments rested its decision on the ground that an ultra vires act
could never be done "in pursuance of this Act". This approach would have
emptied the provision of all content, but it would of course have been in
accord with plenty of precedent. Instead, the Court was prepared to contem-
plate the limitation provision protecting some ultra vires acts, namely, those
done under a bona fide belief in facts which, if they existed, would have
afforded a justification under the statute. Rand J., who dissented, accepted
a similar test,49 and was prepared to hold that it was satisfied on the facts of
this case. He would have given effect to the limitation provision, so as to bar
the plaintiff's action.
There is a well-known trilogy of damages actions brought by Jehovah's
Witnesses in Quebec in the 1950s. These cases were briefly referred to earlier
in this article.5 0 In Chaput v. Romain51 police broke up an assembly of
Jehovah's Witnesses which was meeting peacefully in a private house. There
was not a shadow of legal justification for the police action. The Supreme
Court of Canada, sitting as a full bench of nine, unanimously awarded damages
against the policemen involved to the owner of the house. In order to reach
this decision the court had to overcome three privative clauses. Two of these
were six-month limitation provisions, and one was a notice requirement.
The action had been brought outside the short limitation period, and the
required prior notice of action had not been served. Locke J. used the tradi-
tional privative clause reasoning to evade these provisions. Since each police-
man was acting illegally, he was not (in the terms of the various provisions)
"fulfilling any public duty", or acting "in the execution of his duty" or "in
46 Id., at 267.
47 [1958] S.C.R. 177; and see text accompanying note 8, supra.
4 8 Id., at 182 per Kerwin C. J., at 194 per Cartwright J.
491d., at 183-88.
50 See text accompanying notes 5, 6, 7 and 43, supra.
51 [1955] S.C.R. 834.
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the exercise of his functions". 52 But the other judges were more sophisticated.
Kellock J. (with whom Rand J. agreed) pointed out that "if [these expressions]
were to be read literally, the statute would be meaningless, as such acts need
no protection procedurally or otherwise". 53 He applied the same test as was
later used in Beatty v. Kozak. What was required to make the provision
applicable was "a bona fide belief in the existence of a state of facts which,
had they existed, would have justified him in acting as he did".54 The other
concurring opinions were to similar effect. 55
In Lamb v. Benoit56 police arrested a Jehovah's Witness who was dis-
tributing some pamphlets on a street comer, and held her in custody for a
weekend. At the end of the weekend she was offered her freedom in exchange
for signing an undertaking not to sue the police who had arrested and detained
her. She refused, and was then charged with two offences for which the police
had no evidence whatsoever. After her acquittal she sued the police for damages
for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The Court found that the
arrest, detention and prosecution was substantially the work of only one of
three policemen who were sued. The other two escaped liability. The principal
actor's only defence was a cluster of privative clauses similar to those which
were relied upon in Chaput v. Romain. As in the earlier case, the Court held
these clauses unavailing, and awarded damages. However, all of the majority
judges, including Locke J. this time, used the test of the bona fide belief in
facts which if they existed would have afforded a legal justification, or a similar
formulation. They held that this test was not satisfied. The three judges from
Quebec, namely, Taschereau, Fauteux and Abbott JJ., dissented. They did
so on the ground that, although the defendant's actions were legally unjustified,
he was nevertheless acting sufficiently in his official capacity to be protected
by the privative clause.
The third case of the trilogy is Roncarelli v. Duplessis,57 which may enjoy
the distinction of being Canada's best-known judicial decision. It will be
recalled that Premier Duplessis ordered the cancellation of restaurateur
Roncarelli's liquor licence on the ground that Roncarelli was a Jehovah's
Witness who had made a practice of acting as bondsman for Jehovah's Witnesses
who were arrested for distributing "The Watch Tower" and "Awake", allegedly
in breach of municipal by-laws. This was clearly an ultra vires act on the part
of Duplessis. Not only was the cancellation designed to accomplish a purpose
which had nothing to do with the sale of liquor, but Duplessis had no statutory
power to cancel a liquor licence even for good reason. That power lay with
another official, the General Manager of the Liquor Commission, who in this
case had (so the majority of the court found) simply acted -under the dictation
52 Id., at 862.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Concurring opinions were written by Taschereau J. (with whom Kerwin C. J. and
Estey J. agreed), Fauteux I. (with whom Cartwright J. agreed) and Abbott J.
56 [1959] S.C.R. 321.
57 [1959] S.C.R. 121.
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of Duplessis. Roncarelli sued Duplessis for damages, but he omitted to comply
with Article 88 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure. Article 88 provided that:
No public officer or other person fulfilling any public function or duty can be sued
for damages by reason of any act done by him in the exercise of his functions ...
unless notice of such action has been given him at least one month before the issue
of the writ of summons.
The majority of the Court did not allow Duplessis to escape liability by
reason of Article 88. Martland J., with whom Kerwin C.J. and Locke J. agreed,
used the conventional privative clause argument to hold that Duplessis' act,
because it was ultra vires, was not done "in the exercise of his functions".
58
Rand J., with whom Judson J. agreed, seemed to take the same view, although
he was careful to point out that there was no "colour of propriety" in Duplessis'
act.59 Abbott J. framed his reasoning in language more consistent with that in
Lamb v. Benoit:
In my opinion before a public officer can be held to be acting "in the exercise of
his functions", within the meaning of art. 88 C.C.P., it must be established that
at the time he performed the act complained of such public officer had reasonable
ground for believing that such act was within his legal authority to perform...60
But the French-Canadian judges, Taschereau and Fauteux JJ., dissented.61
(The other Quebec judge, Abbott J., who had joined them in dissent in Lamb
v. Benoit, this time voted with the majority.) Taschereau J. said that he could
not "subscribe to the fallacious principle that an error, committed by a public
officer, in doing an act that is connected with the object of his functions, strips
it of its official character, and that its author must then be considered as being
without the scope of his duties".62 Fauteux J. made a similar statement.03
Neither offered any elaboration of their reasons for differing from the majority.
It appears from the cases that the Supreme Court of Canada's approach
to privative clauses differs according to the remedy which is being sought.
Where the remedy being sought is damages against the Crown or an official,
the court will concede some scope for the operation of privative clauses.
Formulations have varied unaccountably, as we have seen, but the predominant
view is that the clauses will protect the defendant from liability for an ultra
vires act if he had a bona fide belief in facts which, if they existed, would have
afforded a justification under the statute. And in the cases concerning privative
clauses in Quebec statutes the French-Canadian judges have been prepared
to give an even wider scope to the clauses, partly no doubt in deference to
interpretations in the Quebec courts. On the other hand, where the remedy
being sought is simply review of an official decision, with no coercive relief
58 Id., at 158.
59 Id., at 144.
60 Id., at 186.
61 Cartwright J. also dissented, but on the ground that the cancellation had been
validly effected by the General Manager of the Liquor Commission. He did not discuss
Article 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
62 Id., at 130; 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689 at 695 (translation into English) (emphasis in
original).
63 Id., at 181, 727.
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against the decision-maker, the Court will usually concede no scope for the
operation of privative clauses. The Court's decision whether or not to review
will not be in any way affected by the existence of a privative clause. (Some
exceptions to this proposition will be considered shortly.)
The difference between the damages cases and the pure review cases
suggests that the Court sees the tort remedy as in the nature of a penalty
imposed upon the defendant decision-maker. Viewed in this light, it is sensible
to interpret the privative clause as excusing the defendant where he acted
without blame, i.e., where he had a bona fide belief in facts which if they
existed would have provided legal justification. In the pure review cases, since
no "penalty" is sought, there is no similar reason for "excusing" the decision-
maker.
Another analysis which might explain the divergent results in the two
classes of case concerns the nature of the privative clauses. In each of the
immigration and labour cases the clause was one which purported to prohibit
review altogether. In Beatty v. Kozak and the Quebec trilogy the clauses
imposed limitation or notice requirements, but did not prohibit review entirely.6
There is obviously a case for construing the absolute clause more strictly than
the notice or limitation clause.
However the results of the cases are rationalized, the almost total futility
of absolute privative clauses in the immigration and labour cases cannot be
defended, for it is nothing short of defiance to the command of the legislature.
If it is possible in the damages cases to find a compromise between a literal
reading of the language of the statute and civil libertarian values, why is it
not possible in the immigration and labour (or pure review) cases? And the
answer is, that a doctrine very similar to that applied in the damages cases
can be applied in the pure review cases.
In the labour board cases the usual neglect of the privative clause is
relieved by some dissenting opinions. In Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe
Printing Co.,65 where a majority of the Court quashed a decision of the Ontario
Labour Relations Board, Rand I. rejected each pole of the all-or-nothing
dichotomy and suggested a middle ground. The Court should only review a
decision protected by a privative clause if the decision is not "within any
rational compass that can be attributed to the statutory language".66 Rand J.'s
eloquent statement of his position is strikingly similar to a well-known passage
from a judgment given by Dixon J. in the High Court of Australia in 1945:
[Privative clauses] are not interpreted as meaning to set at large the [agencies]
to whose decision they relate. Such a clause is interpreted as meaning that no
decision which is in fact given by the body concerned shall be invalidated on the
ground that it has not conformed to the requirements governing its proceedings
or the exercise of its authority or has not confined its acts within the limits laid down
64 The Queen v. Randolph, [1966] S.C.R. 260, discussed in text accompanying note
45, supra, does not fit this analysis, for there the privative clause which was held to be
effective was absolute.
65 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18.
66 Id., at 29.
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by the instrument giving it authority, provided always that its decision is a bona fide
attempt to exercise its power, that it relates to the subject matter of the legislation,
and that it is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body.67
This statement was quoted and applied by Judson J. in his dissenting
opinion in Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services Inc.68 He held that the Labour
Board's decision in that case was protected from review by the privative clause,
because the decision was a bona fide attempt to exercise the Board's power,
the decision related to the subject matter of the legislation, and the decision
was reasonably capable of reference to the Board's powers. Abbott J. agreed
with Judson I., adding a few comments of his own to the same effect. 69
Neither Judson J. nor Abbott J. referred to the damages cases of the 1950's,
but clearly their doctrine if accepted would bring all the privative clause
cases into harmony. In effect the privative clause would become a counsel
of restraint. The official decision must stand, so long as it is rendered in good
faith and bears a defensible relationship to the statutory power.
Does the Rand-Judson-Abbott approach stand any chance of acceptance
by the Supreme Court of Canada? It has in fact been accepted by the Court
in a line of four Workmen's Compensation Board cases; the opinions in each
of the first three cases were written by Judson J., and the opinion in the fourth
was written by Ritchie J.70 There are suggestions of the same approach in
several other opinions written by Judson and Abbott JJ.; and each of these
opinions attracted the concurrence of other members of the court.71 However
the recent decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. International
Union of Operating Engineers72 does not give ground for optimism. In that
case Cartwright C.J., writing for a unanimous court consisting of himself,
Martland, Ritchie, Spence and Pigeon JJ., quashed a decision of the Ontario
Labour Relations Board. The entire discussion of the two privative clauses
in the Board's Act consisted of the following sentence:
I regard the law as well settled that the Board, by asking itself the wrong question,
has stepped outside its jurisdiction and that [the privative clauses] cannot avail to
protect its certificate. 73
It is certainly unfortunate that the Court did not see fit to discuss the
privative clause more fully, especially as the Court was in effect differing
67 The King v. Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945), 70 C.L.R. 598 at 614; and
see P. Brett and P. W. Hogg, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law, supra, note 32
at 546-57.
68 [1964] S.C.R. 497 at 511.
69 Id., at 506.
70Alcyon Shipping Co. Ltd. v. O'Krame, [1961] S.C.R. 299; Farrell v. Workmen's
Compensation Board, [1962] S.C.R. 48; Workmen's Compensation Board v. Rammell,
[1962] S.C.R. 85; Re Kinnaird v. Workmen's Compensation Board, [1963] S.C.R. 239.
71 Saine v. Beauchesne, [1963] S.C.R. 435 at 437-38 per Abbott J. with concurrence
of Taschereau, Fauteux, Judson and Hall JJ.; Commission des Relations Ouvriares de
Quebec v. Burlington Mills Hosiery Co. of Canada Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 342 at 346 per
Abbott J. with concurrence of Taschereau C. J. and Judson J.; cf. Labour Relations
Board (B.C.) v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 46 at 54-55 per Rand J.
72 [1970] S.C.R. 425.
73 Id., at 435.
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from Fraser J. in the Ontario High Court 74 and Laskin J.A. writing for a
unanimous Ontario Court of AppealJ 5 Both these lower courts had held the
Labour Board's decision to be unreviewable for reasons which included the
privative clause.
Is it too much to hope that the Supreme Court may yet repent of this
decision, 76 perceive the relevance of its own decisions in the damages cases
of the 1950s, and be willing to examine the Rand-Judson-Abbott opinions
and the jurisprudence which has developed in Australia? The Court's style of
opinion-writing gives absolutely no grounds for a prediction one way or the
other. It is however relevant to point out that Judson and Abbott JJ. are still
on the Court, and that they have now been joined by Laskin J. who in 1952
as a law professor had argued strongly against the prevailing judicial approach. 77
At the very least the willingness of these three judges to support their approach
with reasons may force the other members of the Court to reconsider the
question.
78
Findings of Fact or Law
Agency findings of fact or law are reviewable if they are jurisdictional
(or collateral). An error as to a "jurisdictional fact" (which includes findings
of law as well as fact) makes the agency's decision void for lack of jurisdiction.
Findings of fact or law which are within jurisdiction (or in issue) are unreview-
able, except in two classes of case: (1) where the remedy sought (and available)
is certiorari and an error of law is apparent on the fact of the agency's record,
and (2) where the legislature by statute has granted a right of appeal (or other
form of review) from the agency's decision on the ground of error of law or fact.
This area of the law bristles with difficulties. When is a finding of fact or
law "jurisdictional"? What is an error of "law"? What degree of respect should
be accorded agency findings of fact or law when there is a power to review?
These difficulties are familiar to administrative lawyers, and will not be
elaborated here.79 It suffices to say that the concepts of "jurisdiction" and
74 (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 109.
75(1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 652.
76The commentary on the decision has generally been critical: J. G. Norwood,
supra, note 4; P. C. Weiler, supra, note 2 at 30; P. W. Hogg, supra, note 4 at 212; J. N. Lyon,
supra, note 4.
77 B. Laskin, supra, note 37, discussed in the text accompanying note 42, supra. For a
possible guide to Laskin J.'s judicial attitude to privative clauses, see his opinion for the
Court in Pringle v. Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821, refusing to grant certiorari on the ground
that the statutory appeal procedure of the Immigration Appeal Board Act was exclusive.
His lordship did however expressly deny the relevance of the privative clause cases.
78 Woodward Estate v. Minister of Finance (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 608 (S.C. Can.)
appears to be a new development. In that case a privative clause which ratified prior
decisions (as well as purporting to protect future decisions) was held effective to exclude
review even for excess of jurisdiction. Martland J. wrote the opinion for a seven-man
court, of which Abbott and Judson JJ., but not Laskin J., were members.
79 There is an enormous literature on these problems. Discussion, and references to
the best-known writing, will be found in S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action (2nd ed. London: Stevens, 1968) at ch. 3; K. C. Davis, supra, note 20 at ch. 30;
L. L. Jaffe, supra, note 12 at Chs. 14, 15 and 16. See also P. Brett and P. W. Hogg, supra,
note 32 at ch. 2; R. F. Reid, supra, note 28 at ch. 11.
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"law" are sufficiently vague - some would say meaningless - to offer a
means of review of any erroneous finding of fact or law. The crucial factor in
each case is the attitude which the judge brings to it. An attitude of restraint,
or a willingness to intervene, can each be justified in the traditional language
of the administrative lawyer. I do not mean to imply that cases are predetermined
by the prejudices of the judges, for the attitude of one judge may vary from
case to case, depending upon his perception of the gravity of the error, and
upon other considerations. However it is true, as we have seen, that in divided
cases some judges vote fairly consistently for the agency while others vote
fairly consistently against it.80
The jurisdictional fact doctrine has been much used in the labour board
cases as a device for reviewing the findings of labour boards. The same doctrine
was applied in two cases in my study, namely, The Queen v. Leong Ba Chai8l
and Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission.82
I have criticized the jurisdictional fact doctrine in general, and the Bell
case in particular, in an earlier article in this journal.8 3 Professor Weller has
criticized the labour cases.84 There is no point in going over the same ground
again. In brief, the Court has used the jurisdictional fact doctrine to substitute
its opinion for that of the agency on matters which (in my view) were peculiarly
within the competence of the agency. It has used the doctrine as a kind of
underground appeal when no appeal had been expressly provided. The values
of judicial restraint, extolled earlier in this article, and evident in other areas
of the Court's work, have been utterly submerged by a mistaken zeal to
"correct" the agency's decision.
Apart from the two cases mentioned, the jurisdictional fact doctrine
has not cast its dark shadow outside the labour area. In two cases errors of
law by agencies have been corrected on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.85 In cases arising otherwise than by appeal from the agency the
Court has shown commendable restraint. In Farrell v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Board86 Judson J. for a unanimous court refused to enter into the
80 The "jurisdictional fact" cases in which the Court was divided are: Toronto
Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18; Labour Relations Board
(B.C.) v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 46; Commission des Relations Ouvriares
de Quebec v. Burlington Mills Hosiery Co. of Canada Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 342; Jarvis v.
Associated Medical Services Inc., [1964] S.C.R. 497; Bell v. Ontario Human Rights
Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 756. The voting in these cases bears some relationship to
the overall pattern of voting described earlier. Thus Abbott J. is consistently in favour of
the agency, while Fauteux J. is consistently against it. On the other hand, Judson J., who
usually votes for the agency, voted to review in Bell, and Spence J., who usually votes
against the agency, voted for the agency in Jarvis.
81 [1954] S.C.R. 10.
82 [1971] S.C.R. 756.
83 (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 203. For a reply, see D. Mullan, The Jurisdic-
tional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada -A Mitigating Plea (1972), 10
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 440.
84 (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 at 17-33.
85Joy Oil Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 624; Township of Scarborough v.
City of Toronto, [1956] S.C.R. 450.
86 [1962] S.C.R. 48.
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question whether the Board was correct in deciding that a workman's death
was not the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment. "This issue", said Judson J., "is unquestionably within the
jurisdiction of the Board under Part I of the Act and even if there was error,
whether in law or fact, it was made within the exercise of the jurisdiction
and is not open to any judicial review, including certiorari". 87 There was a
privative clause in that case, and the reference to certiorari was no doubt
made explicit in order to make plain that the privative clause successfully
precluded review for error of law on the face of the record, which is available
only on certiorari. 88 The interesting feature of the case, for present purposes,
is the refusal to apply the jurisdictional fact doctrine in order to review the
finding that there had been no accident arising out of and in the course of
the employment. Judson J. does not even mention the doctrine, yet it could
have been applied with as much (or as little, as I think) justification to a
Workmen's Compensation Board, as to a Labour Relations Board.
A similarly restrained approach is evident in two immigration cases
where a deportee argued that the immigration officials had misconstrued
their regulations.8 9 One case arose on certiorari, and the other on appeal,
so that in each case error of law was available as a ground of review. In each
case the officials had construed the regulations very literally, and this had
produced what seemed (to me at least) a harsh result to the would-be immi-
grant. In each case dissenting opinions held that the officials had erred in
law in interpreting the regulations so harshly, but the majority sustained the
official interpretation and held that no error of law had been committed.
Discretionary Action
As one might expect, the largest class of cases in the study (34 out of
71) was concerned with the exercise of discretion by officials or agencies.
The blackletter law here is of course that an exercise of a discretion which has
been conferred by statute on an official or agency is unreviewable in the
courts. In order to be protected from attack, however, the discretionary
action must be exercised within the limits defined by the statute. If the action
taken is outside the express limits of power, then the problem is simple.
A power to regulate the sale of meat will not authorize a regulation con-
cerning the sale of grain. In practice, however, the cases which arise are
not so simple. Typically, the statutory power is expressed in language which
is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Under one interpretation the
action is authorized. Under another it is unauthorized. Complicating the
question still further is the doctrine that there are certain implied limitations
on the exercise of all statutory discretions: they must not be exercised in
bad faith, or for an improper purpose, or upon irrelevant considerations.
What is an "improper purpose" or an "irrelevant consideration"? In theory
these are purposes or considerations which lie outside the scope and purpose
of the enabling statute. However there is usually room for disagreement as
87 1d., at 5 1.
89 See supra, note 41.
89 Espaillat-Rodriguez v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 3; Mihm v. Minister of Manpower
and Immigration, [1970] S.C.R. 348.
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to whether a given purpose or consideration is properly within the scope and
purpose of the enabling statute. On one view it will be proper; on another
it will be improper.
The result of a case involving an attack on a discretionary decision is
highly unpredictable. It will often depend upon the cast of mind with which
the judge approaches his task. The judge who thinks he sees a grievance
unredressed will usually be able to interpret the empowering statute so as
to allow him to review. The judge who prefers to defer to the judgment of
the agency will usually be able to interpret the empowering statute so as to
justify the agency action.
There is a danger that the doctrines of improper purpose or irrelevant
considerations will be used by a court as a device to substitute its opinion
on the contested matter for that of the statutory agency. This is an illegitimate
extension of the power of judicial review. My view is that here, as elsewhere,
the agency should be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. But cases
do arise, as I hope my earlier discussion of Smith and Rhuland Ltd. v. The
Queen90 has shown, where an agency uses its power to accomplish an end
which is not reasonably within the scope of its empowering statute. Where,
as in Smith and Rhuland, the agency uses a vaguely-worded discretion to
impair values fundamental to the legal order as a whole, or where the court
is convinced that the statutory scheme cannot on any reasonable view support
what has been done, then review is justified and indeed demanded. Such
cases are however infrequent.
On the whole, the Supreme Court of Canada has chosen the wise path
of deference to the agency's perception of its role. Only a small minority
of the decisions which were attacked as an abuse of discretion were actually
quashed, and those that were quashed often attracted dissenting support from
some members of the court.
The results, but not the judges' opinions, show that the Supreme Court
has felt freer to review exercises of official discretion when they are by
statute appealable into the Supreme Court itself. This used to be the case
with many of the federal agencies, and this probably explains why the rate
of review of those agency's decisions is higher than in any other class of case.
Out of five appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada from decisions by
federal agencies, on the ground of an improper exercise of discretion, all five
appeals were successful.91 Three other cases in which exercises of discretion
by federal agencies were under attack, but not on appeal, produced two
affirmations of the agency decision and one quashing.92 The last was sub-
90 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95; see text accompanying note 10, supra.
91 C.P.R. v. Alberta, [1950] S.C.R. 25; Joy Oil Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1951] S.C.R.
624; Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co. Ltd. v. Alberta Natural Gas Co., [1963] S.C.R. 257;
Metcalfe Telephones Ltd. v. McKenna, [1964] S.C.R. 202; Confederation Broadcasting
(Ottawa) Ltd. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 906.
92 Canadian Wheat Board v. Nolan, [1951] S.C.R. 81 (reversed by P.C., [1952] A.C.
427); Canadian Bank of Commerce v. A.-G. Can., [1962] S.C.R. 729; Procureur Giniral
du Canada v. La Compagnie de Publication La Presse Lte, [1967] S.C.R. 60.
1973]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
sequently reversed by the Privy Council, the case having commenced before
the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.
93
A notable feature of the cases studied is how few of them involved any
flagrant abuse of power. The three cases brought by Jehovah's Witnesses
in Quebec, which have already been discussed in the context of the role of
the court and in the context of privative clauses, fall into this class. 94 In each
of them there was an exercise of power without any shadow of statutory
justification, and in each case the official action invaded the basic freedoms
of worship or personal liberty of an unpopular minority. Dicey would have
delighted in these cases, as classic illustrations of his concept of the rule of
law. And they do indeed demonstrate - in my mind at least - the absolute
necessity of some degree of judicial review of administrative action.
95
The remaining 30 or so discretion cases do not present a picture of
irresponsible, arbitrary or oppressive action by officials. On the contrary,
in the main it is clear that the officials under attack were acting honestly
and conscientiously in the exercise of what they believed to be their powers.
Even that dreaded creature, the honest but over-zealous official, is not really
in evidence. I recognize of course that the proportion of cases which reach
the Supreme Court of Canada is minute, and that those which do may not
convey to the reader the full flavour of the facts. Nevertheless, if bureaucratic
oppression were a widespread Canadian problem one would expect more
evidence of it to surface at the Supreme Court level.
In five cases would-be immigrants challenged decisions by federal
immigration officials on the basis that there had been an improper exercise
of discretion. Four of the five decisions were upheld, with dicta as to the
unreviewability of "administrative" discretion. 96 The fifth, where the official
decision was upset, is an aberration in that it involved a very strict reading
of the statutory power.97 The power could easily have been read as supporting
the action taken, as the dissenting opinion of Abbott J. (concurred in by
Taschereau and Judson JJ.) showed.
The provincial agencies which regulate utility rates have been attacked
four times on the basis of an improper exercise of discretion. They have won
three98 and lost one.99 In the one lost there was a disagreement between the
93 A.-G. Can. v. Hallet and Carey Ltd., [1952] A.C. 427.
94 Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121;
Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R. 321; see text accompanying notes 5-7 and 51-63, supra.
Beatty v. Kozak, [1958] S.C.R. 177 might arguably be added to the list, but it was a much
less clear case than the others, as Rand J.'s dissent shows.
95 This point is elaborated in my article Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?
(1972), supra, note 3.
96 Masella v. Langlais, [1955] S.C.R. 263; Narine-Singh v. A.-G. Can., [1955] S.C.R.
395; Louie Yuet Sun v. The Queen, [1961] S.C.R. 70; Moore v. Minister of Manpower
and Immigration, [1968] S.C.R. 839.
97 Violi v. Superintendent of Immigration, [1965] S.C.R. 232.
98 Union Gas of Canada Ltd. v. Sydenham Gas and Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1957] S.C.R.
185; Memorial Gardens Assn. (Canada) Ltd. v. Cohwood Cemetary Co., [1958] S.C.R.
353; City of Edmonton v. Northwestern Utilities Ltd., [1961] S.C.R. 392.
99 B.C. Electric Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Public Utilities Commission of British Columbia,
[1960] S.C.R. 837.
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agency and the Court as to the priority to be accorded various factors in
fixing electricity rates. The agency view was at least defensible, and it attracted
the support of Kerwin C.J., who dissented on the ground that the weight to
be assigned to each factor in rate-fixing was a matter for the agency.
Then there is a group of six cases in which disciplinary rules or decisions
were attacked on the basis of an improper exercise of discretion. The disciplinary
bodies in these cases - a police superintendent,100 a Board of Hospital Trust-
ees,101 the Ontario Racing Commission,102 a physicians' discipline committee
0 3
and a pilotage authority 04 have been upheld every time save one. The excep-
tional decision' 05 denied to the Minister of Transport as pilotage authority the
power to classify pilots for the purpose of their salary and the class of ships with
which they could be entrusted. The Minister's power was to "make regulations
for the government of pilots". Similarly vague language had been given wide
scope in the other discipline cases, but in this one the Court unexpectedly
asserted its power of review. This decision was unanimous, but the Court did not
include Abbott or Judson JJ.
The most numerous class of discretion cases concerned those in which
a municipal exercise of discretion was attacked. Where an elected local body
has decided a local question the general argument for judicial restraint is
reinforced by a democratic principle. This point is occasionally made explicit
in judicial dicta.106 There were nine cases in the study in which the decision
of a municipal council was attacked as an improper exercise of discretion.
The attack was successful in three. The first successful attack, in Ross v. The
Queen,10 7 involved a by-law governing the parking of taxi-cabs on private
property for the purpose of obtaining passengers. In this case there was an
argument in favour of the by-law which was sufficiently strong to attract
Kerwin C.J.'s dissenting vote. But the majority were impressed with the fact
that the by-law purported to apply to taxi-cabs licensed by municipalities
other than the enacting municipality. It would require clear and specific
words to confer "so unusual a power". 108 No doubt too, though it was not
emphasized by the Court, the fact that the by-law would affect the livelihood
of cab-drivers contributed to the narrow construction of the empowering
statute.
The second case, Metropolitan Toronto v. Village of Forest Hill,10 9
concerned a by-law providing for the fluoridation of drinking water. The
100 The Queen and Archer v. White, [1956] S.C.R. 154.
101 Henderson v. Johnston, [1959] S.C.R. 655.
102 Wm. F. Morrissey Ltd. v. Ontario Racing Commission, [1960] S.C.R. 104.
1o3 Saine v. Beauchesne, [1963] S.C.R. 435.
104 Jones and Maheux v. Gamache, [1969] S.C.R. 119; 7 D.L.R. (3d) 316 (translation
into English of Pigeon J's opinion); Baldwin v. Pouliot, [1969] S.C.R. 577.
105 Jones and Maheux v. Gamache, [1969] S.C.R. 119.
10E.g., Kruse v. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 91 at 100 per Lord Russell of Killowen;
Citd de Sillery v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd., [ 1964] S.C.R. 552 at 556 per Abbott J.
107 [1955] S.C.R. 430.
108 Id., at 438.
109 [1957] S.C.R. 569.
1973]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
statutory power was to enact by-laws to secure a supply of "pure and whole-
some water". It seems to me that the principle of judicial restraint should
have been applied in this case to uphold the municipality's interpretation of
its powers. This was the approach taken by Kerwin C.J. and Locke J. in
dissent, each of whom explicity stated that the judicial role should be
restrained.110 On the other hand, the fluoridation of drinking water is seen
by some as a major civil liberties issue. This was not explicity recognized by
the majority, but it may explain their holding that the power to supply
"pure and wholesome water" did not authorize the pursuing of "a special
health purpose".111 The voting in this case was interesting. I have already
mentioned that Locke J., who dissented, wrote an opinion in support of the
municipality and explicitly grounded his decision on a doctrine of judicial
restraint. And yet his overall voting record has been far from restrained,
as noted earlier in the discussion of voting patterns. 12 It is even more
surprising to find that the five judges in the majority included Abbott J.,
whose overall voting record has been very restrained indeed.113 It may be
that the key to these unexpected votes, and to the majority decision to
intervene, lies in the fluoridation issue which at that time was being hotly
debated and which was perceived in very different ways by those engaged
in the controversy.
The third case in which a municipal exercise of discretion was success-
fully attacked, City of Ottawa v. Boyd Builders Ltd.,"4 involved a zoning
by-law. Other challenges to zoning by-laws have been uniformly unsuccess-
ful.115 The private property interest which is affected by such by-laws has
not led to a strict construction of zoning powers. This is because the whole
purpose of the power to zone is to limit the uses to which private property
may be put.116 In Boyd Builders, however, the municipal council had enacted
the by-law to prohibit the building of apartments on land owned by a
developer after the developer had applied for a building permit. The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision in which both Abbott and Judson JJ.
participated, held that a generally-worded zoning power, although it always
defeats pre-existing property rights to some extent, could not defeat the rights
of an owner who had actually applied for a building permit under the old
zoning.
These three cases each involved a somewhat unexpected use of statutory
power in derogation of individual liberties, and they can clearly be accom-
110 Id., at 571 per Kerwin C. ., at 580 per Locke 1.
111 Id., at 574.
112 Locke J. participated in eleven divided decisions and voted to sustain the agency
in only three (including this one).
113 Abbott J. participated in eighteen divided decisions and voted to sustain the
agency in fifteen.
114 [1965] S.C.R. 408.
115 Township of Scarborough v. Bondi, [1959] S.C.R. 444; Canadian Petrofina Ltd.
v. Martin, [1959] S.C.R. 453; Taylor Blvd. Realties Ltd. v. City of Montreal, [1964]
S.C.R. 195; Cit6 de Sillery v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 552.
116See, e.g., Canadian Petrofina Ltd. v. Martin, [1959] S.C.R. 453 at 458 per
Fauteux J.
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modated within a general pattern of judicial restraint. The remaining municipal
discretion cases displayed a liberal interpretation of municipal power, and
upheld the attacked discretion.
117
Delegation of Discretion
In City of Verdun v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd.118 the Sun Oil Co. applied for and
obtained mandamus to compel the council of the City of Verdun to grant
to it permission to build a service station on a particular location in the city.
Quebec's Cities and Towns Act gave to the city council the power "to make
by-laws . . . to regulate the location within the municipality of industrial
and commercial establishments and other buildings intended for special
purposes". Pursuant to this power, the City of Verdun had enacted a by-law
which required application to build a service station in the city to be made
to the city council. The application had to be examined by the city's building
inspector, who had to certify to the council whether the proposal satisfied
the by-laws and would not endanger life or property. Then, under the by-law,
the City Council "may, at its discretion, grant or deny the permission
applied for". The Supreme Court of Canada held that this last portion of the
by-law, which purported to grant to the City Council discretion to grant or
deny permission, was ultra vires. Sun Oil, which had satisfied the requirements
of the by-laws, and which had obtained a favourable certificate from the
building inspector, was entitled to be granted permission to erect its service
station. The contrary decision of the City Council was a nullity.
Fauteux J., who wrote the unanimous opinion of a court comprising
himself, Taschereau, Kellock, Estey and Cartwright JJ., held that the vice
of the by-law was that it "effectively transforms an authority to regulate by
legislation into a mere administrative and discretionary power to cancel by
resolution...".119 The right to regulate, he held, "is to be maintained at the
legislative level and not to be brought down exclusively within the adminis-
trative field, as it was in the present instance". 120 He pointed out that a by-law
is passed only after certain formalities; it is general in its application; and
it is published. A mere resolution, by contrast, could be passed by majority
vote at any meeting of a council which changes in its composition; it need
apply only to one case; and it need not be published. Thus the permission
to build a service station would be left "to the mere whim of the persons
who might form the council of any particular meeting", and the door would
117 Bouchard v. School Commissioners of Saint-Mathieu-de-Dixville, [1950] S.C.R.
479 (expulsion of students from school); Township of North York v. Metropolitan
Toronto, [1965] S.C.R. 401 (levy on area municipalities). The zoning cases are referred
to in note 115, supra. There are two cases in which a discretionary decision of the Ontario
Municipal Board (which is not an elected body) has been successfully attacked: Township
of Scarborough v. City of Toronto, [1956] S.C.R. 450; Etobicoke Board of Education v.
Highbury Developments Ltd., [1958] S.C.R. 196.
118 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222.
119 Id., at 229.
120 Id.
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be open "to discrimination and arbitrary, unjust and oppressive interference
in particular cases".
121
The same kind of reasoning was used, again by Fauteux J. for a
unanimous court, in City of Outremont v. Protestant School Trustees 22 to
hold invalid a by-law which purported to give to a city council a discretion
to "allow the construction of churches, schools and hospitals" in areas
reserved for private housing. And in City of Toronto v. Outdoor Neon
Displays Ltd.123 Cartwright J. for a unanimous court held that a by-law which
purported to confer on a building inspector an "uncontrolled discretionary
power" to grant or refuse permission to erect signs would be ultra vires a
power to regulate by by-law. In light of this principle he held that the by-law
could be saved by construing it as not conferring discretion upon the building
inspector: he was obliged to approve any sign which satisfied the city's by-laws.
This strong anti-delegation doctrine has been applied by the Court once
outside the municipal area. In A.-G. Canada v. Brent 24 the court held that
immigration regulations were invalid because they handed the subject matter
to be regulated over to the discretion of special inquiry officers. "There is no
power", said Kerwin C.J. for the Court, "in the Governor General-in-Council
to delegate his authority to such officers".125
The opinions in all these cases seem to me to be incomplete. Of course
there is force in the reasons given by Fauteux J. for his decision in City of
Verdun v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd.126 If the legislature gives to a municipal council
(or other agency) a power to regulate development by by-law, it is obviously
arguable that it intends only the specified body (the municipal council) to
exercise the power, and then only in the manner specified (by by-law). And
yet a moment's reflection suffices to demonstrate that such a rule could never
be absolute. No regime of control over development (for example) could
work unless discretionary power were delegated to the council or to sub-
ordinate officials. Effective government usually involves the delegation of
discretion to officials. When the legislature delegates a power to legislate to
a subordinate agency, it must be taken to impliedly authorize the further
delegation of at least some degree of discretionary power. By condemning
so roundly and absolutely the admittedly broad delegations in the cases
mentioned the Supreme Court of Canada has failed to provide guidance in
answering the crucial question: to what extent is delegation authorized? The
answer which these cases seem to give is: not at all.
That the answer cannot be so absolute, is shown by the Court's own
decision in Bridge v. The Queen.127 This is the only case in the study in which
121 Id., at 230, quoting from Corporation du Village de Ste.-Agathe v. Reid (1904),
Q.R. 10 R. de 1. 334 at 337-38.
122 [1952] 2S.C.R. 506.
123 [1960] S.C.R. 307.
124 [1956] S.C.R. 318.
125 Id., at 321.
126 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222.
127 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 8.
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an anti-delegation argument has failed.128 In that case the City of Hamilton
had statutory power to provide by by-law for the opening and closing hours
of gasoline service stations; the power expressly included power to "provide
for the issuing of permits authorizing [a station] to be and remain open,
notwithstanding the by-law, during the part or parts of the day or days
specified in the permit". The City by by-law established a regime for the
issue of permits for evening and Sunday opening on a rotational basis. It
gave powers to administer the scheme to a committee of the council and to
the City Clerk, and they had certain discretionary powers to sort out the
details of the rotation. The by-law was attacked on the basis that it involved
an invalid delegation. The majority of the Supreme Court rejected this
argument. Cartwright J., who wrote the opinion, explained that the by-law
had "provided with sufficient particularity for the issuing of permits", and
that the duties which it delegated were merely "administrative". 129 He did
not elaborate on what was meant by "sufficient particularity" or "adminis-
trative". Rand J. dissented. He agreed that "administrative details could be
left to a committee or an official", but that "no part of the legislative action
or discretion reposed by the legislature in the council could be delegated to
any other body or person". 130 He considered that the by-law left room for
"significant judgment ' 131 in the committee and City Clerk, and that this made
it invalid. Although Rand J. never explicitly says so, he seems to equate
"legislative" discretion with discretion involving "significant judgment".
The use of the classification of functions to solve problems of delegation
is by no means unknown in Canadian courts.132 "Administrative" discretion
can be delegated, so it is said, but not "legislative" or "judicial" discretion.
But unless these labels are satisfactorily defined, and they never are, they
serve only to conceal the reasons which have led a judge to allow or disallow
a particular delegation. Indeed, if a judge takes the labels seriously he may
well be distracted from the considerations which really are relevant to the
issue whether a particular delegation should be allowed. For example,
Rand J.'s opinion in Bridge pointed out the complexities of fairly rotating
among service stations in a municipality the right to open for extended hours.
He regarded his discussion as demonstrating that "significant judgment" had
been delegated, which was "legislative" and bad. But for the reader who is
not spellbound by the classification of functions Rand J.'s opinion demon-
strates the impossibility of operating a fair scheme without delegating "signifi-
cant judgment" to some official; the commonsense conclusion is that the
delegation should be regarded as essential to effective government and good.
Professor John Willis, writing in the Canadian Bar Review in 1943,133
128 There are cases in which the Court simply closes its eyes to a delegation of power,
e.g., Mehr v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [1955] S.C.R. 344; Violi v. Superintendent
of Immigration, [1965] S.C.R. 232.
129 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 8 at 14.
130 Id., at 16.
131 Id., at 17.
132E.g., R. v. Campbell (1962), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 579 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Joy Oil Co.
Ltd. (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 291 (Ont. C.A.).
133 J. Willis, Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257.
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suggested an approach to delegation which would avoid any need to classify
functions as "administrative" or "legislative". He pointed out that delegation
problems raise a clash of two competing policies. On the one hand, the
legislature must be presumed to have desired that the agency which it named
should exercise the discretion given to it. On the other hand, the legislature
must be presumed to have desired that the process of government should go
on in its accustomed and most effective manner. To determine which of these
two policies should be paramount in a particular situation the court has to
examine the known practices and apprehended needs of the agency involved,
and the alternative ways in which the purpose of the statute could be accom-
plished. No doubt, this kind of instruction to the courts will not provide high
predictability of decisions, but at least the courts would be addressing them-
selves to the relevant considerations. The courts in the United Kingdom and
Australia now tend to follow the Willis approach. 134 But the Supreme Court
of Canada has not only never referred to Willis' fine article, but shows no
indication of having read it. This is not to say that the Court's delegation
decisions are wrong, or even that they are grounded on different reasons.
It may well be that the Court is conscious of the need to balance the require-
ments of effective government against the ideal of personally-exercised dis-
cretion, but the task is never performed openly in its opinions. Thus, the
opinions in the three municipal planning cases with which this discussion
opened never ask whether a town planning regime can be established without
the subdelegation of significant discretion; and the opinion in A.-G. Canada
v. Brent never asks whether a regime of controlled immigration can be
established without the subdelegation of discretion. The aims of the statute,
and the needs of the statutory agency, are simply not discussed. If the Court
had addressed itself to these issues it might have been more sympathetic to
the problems of the agency, and less ready to attack its decision to delegate
its function. Here, as elsewhere, there should be a presumption in favour of
judicial restraint.
Natural Justice
The rules of natural justice are procedural limitations on the exercise
of certain statutory powers. There are two rules: (1) that the decision-maker
must give to the persons affected an opportunity to be heard, and (2) that
the decision-maker must be unbiased.
The constitutional justification for the imposition of procedural require-
ments by the court upon the agency is that the court is merely "interpreting"
the agency's empowering statute. When the legislature confers authority upon
an agency to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects the legis-
lature could not have intended the authority to be exercised in breach of
fundamental principles of justice. That is how the argument runs, when it is
spelled out (which is seldom). The argument cannot, of course, be invoked
when the legislature has made it clear that the agency need not provide an
opportunity to be heard, or need not be unbiased. There is no constitutional
134See Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works, [1943] 2 All E.R. 560; Vine V.
National Dock Labour Board, [1957] A.C. 488; Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney,
[1964] N.S.W.R. 1000.
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impediment to the various Canadian provincial legislatures doing just that.
Since 1960 the federal Parliament has been subject to the Canadian Bill of
Rights, which by s.2 (e) provides that no law of Canada shall be construed
or applied so as to:
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.
It may be that s.2 (e) would render inoperative a provision in a federal
statute which purported to exclude the rules of natural justice from a statutory
power which would otherwise be subject to the rules.1 35 Section 2(e) has
been relied upon in three cases in the Supreme Court of Canada. 136 In each
of them it was in effect held to be merely declaratory of the rules of natural
justice. But so far a federal provision purporting to exclude natural justice
has not reached the Court for a decision as to whether it conflicts with s.2 (e).
The natural justice cases raise two kinds of problems: (1) when are
the rules applicable?, and (2) what is the content of each rule?137 The
purpose of the rules is to ensure procedural fairness. There is such a variety
of situations to which the rules must apply that it would be unreasonable
to expect clear and precise definitions from the courts which will cover all
cases. On the other hand, the courts are in my view well suited to the task
of elaborating the requirements of natural justice. Where the rights of
individuals may be affected by official action there are certain values of
procedural fairness which apply to a wide variety of otherwise different
agencies, which are therefore susceptible of generalized statement, and which
the courts are peculiarly well placed to formulate. The courts have a long
tradition of concern with their own procedure and with those of the sub-
ordinate bodies which for centuries have come before them on certiorari.
This is not to say that the courts should impose courtroom rules of pro-
cedure and evidence upon the agencies. That would utterly defeat the
objectives of speed and informality. The court must start with a presumption
in favour of restraint, which means deferring to any reasonable agency
decision as to its own procedure. But the court is well equipped to identify
the point at which an agency's procedure ceases to be merely informal and
becomes positively unfair. At that point judicial intervention is justified.
The Supreme Court of Canada has not been successful in producing
consistent, principled decisions in the natural justice area. It has rather
produced "a wilderness of single instances". It would not be profitable to
135 The Canadian Bill of Rights, by s. 2, allows the federal Parliament to exempt any
statute from its provisions by declaring that the statute shall operate notwithstanding the
Bill of Rights. There is also a question whether the Bill of Rights, being an ordinary statute,
can have any effect on statutes enacted after it.
136 Rebrin v. Bird, [1961] S.C.R. 376; Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12; The Queen
v. Randolph, [1966] S.C.R. 260.
137 A third problem which occasionally arises is: what is the effect of breach of the
rules? Do they make the resulting decision void or voidable? See Wiswell v. Metropolitan
Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [1956] S.C.R. 512; S. A. de Smith, supra, note 79 at
222,260.
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discuss all sixteen of the natural justice decisions during the period of study. 138
But the deficiency in the Court's work may be fairly demonstrated by taking
six of the best-known of the cases.
139
Four of the cases concern the problem of when the rules of natural
justice are applicable. The first is Board of Health (Saltfleet Township) v.
Knapman.14o In that case the Board of Health had statutory power to require
the occupants of a building used as a dwellinghouse to quit it, where the
Board was satisfied that the building had become (1) unfit for the purpose
of a dwelling, or (2) a nuisance, or (3) dangerous or injurious to the health
of the occupants or the public. The Board in exercise of this power required
the occupants of several dwellinghouses owned by Knapman to be vacated.
Knapman and the occupants were refused a hearing by the Board, which
made its decision in a closed meeting. The Supreme Court of Canada,
affirming the Ontario courts, issued certiorari to quash the decision. Cart-
wright I., who wrote the opinion of four of the five members of the Court,
said that in determining whether or not one of the specified causes for the
exercise of its power existed, the Board was under a "duty to act judicially";
it had to give the occupants "an opportunity to know which of such causes
was alleged to exist or [sc. and] to make answer to the allegation". 141
Knapman was about as easy a case for the application of the rules of
natural justice as one finds in the reports. It is perhaps not surprising,
although I think it is unfortunate, that the Court did not refer to any of the
many authorities which hold that a power to take away property rights is
normally subject to the rules of natural justice. It is also, in my view,
unfortunate that the Court referred to the "duty to act judicially", and never
used the term "natural justice" at all.
Two years later a similar case came before the Court. In Calgary Power
Ltd. v. Copithorne'42 the issue was whether the Minister of Agriculture for
Alberta was under a duty to provide an opportunity to be heard to a land-
owner before expropriating a right of way for electricity lines over the
landowner's land. The Minister had expropriated a right of way over
138 The exclusion from my study of the labour board cases means that the number
sixteen comprises only the non-labour cases. It does not include, for example, the im-
portant cases of Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18 or
Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques de Montrdal v. Labour Relations Board of Quebec,
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 140.
139One well-known case which, because it stands somewhat on its own, I have not
discussed in the text is King v. University of Saskatchewan, [1969] S.C.R. 678. The
doctrine laid down there that a fair hearing on appeal cures defects of natural justice in
lower proceedings seems to me to be highly dubious. In my opinion the existence of an
appeal prima facie entitles the appellant to two fair hearings- at first instance as well
as on appeal. If the first hearing if unfair much of the value of having an appeal is lost.
In this respect an appeal should not be confused with a genuine rehearing by the same
body as originally committed the breach of natural justice; in that situation I agree that
the rehearing should cure the defect: see Ridge v. Baldwin, [19641 A.C. 40; Posluns v.
Toronto Stock Exchange, [1968] S.C.R. 330.
140 11956] S.C.R. 877.
141 Id., at 879.
142 [1959] S.C.R. 24.
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Copithorne's ranch without giving to Copithorne an opportunity to be heard.
The one difference between this case and Knapman was that in Knapman
the conditions for the exercise of the Board's powers were precisely spelled
out in the empowering statute. Here the Minister's statutory power was
expressed in much vaguer language - to expropriate land "which the Minister
may deem necessary for the authorized undertaking". The issue in Calgary
Power therefore was whether a broad discretionary power over property
should also be subjected to the requirements of natural justice.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada is astonishing in its
failure to address itself to this issue. The decision was that the Minister did
not have to provide an opportunity for Copithorne to be heard. The Court
included two members of the Knapman court, namely Cartwright J., who
had written the Knapman opinion, and Locke J., who had agreed with it.
And yet Martland J.'s opinion for the Court in Calgary Power failed even
to refer to the Knapman decision of two years earlier. Instead, Martland J.
turned to the dictum of Lord Hewart in the Church Assembly case 143 to
the effect that a body which had legal authority to determine questions
affecting the rights of subjects was only obliged to give a hearing if it was
subject to a "super-added duty to act judicially". 44 Martland J. then embarked
on a search for that elusive super-added duty to act judicially and did not
find it: the Minister's duties were "not judicial or quasi-judicial", but were
merely "administrative". 45
The use of the classification of functions to decide issues of natural
justice thoroughly obfuscates the relevant issues, for it involves a search for
a concept which no-one has ever succeeded in defining. In recent years this
approach has fallen out of favour with most courts, thanks mainly to the fine
opinion by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin.146 Why the Supreme Court of Canada
in 1958 should suddenly neglect its own prior decision in Knapman for such a
sterile conceptual approach is a mystery to me.
Compounding further the confusion which the Supreme Court has
wrought in this area is Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater
Winnipeg.147 The Council of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Win-
nipeg had enacted a by-law rezoning a parcel of land formerly zoned for
single family dwellings so as to permit the erection of an apartment building
on the land. A local homeowners' association brought proceedings to have
the by-law declared void on the ground that inadequate notice of the pro-
posed rezoning had been given to neighbouring owners. There was no
statutory procedure laid down for the enactment of amendments to zoning
by-laws. However, council had passed a resolution establishing the procedure
of (1) advertising the rezoning application in two Winnipeg newspapers,
and (2) posting notice of the application on the land affected. The council
had failed to take the second step of posting on the premises. What the
143 R. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, [1928] 1 K.B. 411 at 415.
144 [1959] S.C.R. 24 at 30.
14 5 Id., at 34.
146 [1964] A.C. 40.
147 [1965] S.C.R. 512.
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council had done was to advertise the application for rezoning in two Winni-
peg newspapers. The homeowners' association had not seen these advertise-
ments because the official of the association who perused the advertisements
had been on vacation when they appeared. The association had therefore
not taken up the advertised opportunity to appear before a committee of
council and oppose the rezoning.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the failure to
post notice of the rezoning application on the land (or to give specific notice
to the homeowners' association) was fatal to the validity of the rezoning
by-law. Hall J., who wrote for the majority, classified the council's function
in enacting the by-law as not "legislative" but "quasi-judicial"; the council
was therefore "required to act fairly and impartially".148 In Hall J.'s view,
it had not done so. Judson I. dissented. He agreed that council "could not
act without notice to those affected", but in his view the newspaper adver-
tisements were "clear, reasonable and adequate notice", and the "failure to
direct the posting of notices pursuant to their own internal regulations, which
were subject to their own control, does not affect the validity of the by-law". 149
Wiswell is similar to Calgary Power in its reliance on the classification
of functions. Iudson J.'s dissenting judgment breathed some commonsense
into the law reports by condemning that approach: 150
I do not think that it helps one towards a solution of this case to put a label on
the form of activity in which the Metropolitan Council was engaged when it passed
this amending by-law. Counsel for the municipality wants to call it legislative and
from that he argues that they could act without notice. The majority of the judges
prefer the term quasi-judicial. However one may characterize the function, it was
one which involved private rights in addition to those of the applicant and I prefer
to say that the municipality could not act without notice to those affected.
Wiswell and Calgary Power are consistent if one is prepared to accept
the labelling of official activity as decisive of natural justice issues. If one
is not, then the cases seem to be irreconcileable. In Calgary Power a broad
discretion to expropriate land was held to require no prior notice even to
the person whose land was to be taken. In Wiswell the discretion to amend
the zoning by-law was just as broad, and the person whose land was to be
rezoned had actively sought the rezoning. The claim to notice by the neigh-
bouring owners in Wiswell is weaker than the claim in Calgary Power, since
the interest of a person in the rezoning of someone else's land is less direct
than the interest of a person in the expropriation of his own land. How then
did the Court in Wiswell distinguish its own earlier decision in Calgary Power?
The answer, incredible as it may seem, may be verified by examination of
the report: the Court did not even refer to Calgary Power.
The remaining important case in the study concerning the applicability
of the rules of natural justice is Guay v. Lafleur.151 In that case an officer
of the National Revenue Department was conducting an inquiry into the
148 Id., at 522.
149 Id., at 526.
150 Id.
151 [1965] S.C.R. 12.
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affairs of a number of taxpayers, of whom the plaintiff was one. The plaintiff
asked to be present and be represented by counsel during the examination
of all persons summoned by the officer. When this request was refused, the
plaintiff sued for an injunction to stop the proceedings until the plaintiff was
permitted to be present. The Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of
eight to one, refused the injunction. The principal opinion was written by
Abbott J. He lapsed into the regrettable Supreme Court habit of labelling
the official's function. In his view it was "administrative" and not "judicial"
or "quasi-judicial". 152 But he also descended from that metaphysical level
to more down-to-earth considerations. The result of the officer's inquiry
would be an assessment of tax. Once that assessment was made the taxpayer
would have available to him the whole structure of appeals provided by the
Income Tax Act. Abbott J. did not mention the possibility of a criminal
prosecution for breach of the Act, but if this were recommended by the
inquiring officer then the normal safeguards of the criminal procedure would
immediately be available to -the plaintiff. In other words, whatever the result
of the inquiry, the plaintiff was assured of his "day in court" at some stage.
The assurance of a later hearing seems to me to be the crucial element
of Guay v. Lafleur, and it was certainly regarded as important by Abbott J.
Cartwright J.'s concurring opinion, on the other hand, never so much as
mentions this point; he held that the officer's duties "are administrative, they
are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial", 5 3 and he emphasized that the officer
had no power to actually adjudicate upon the plaintiff's rights. Spence J.'s
concurring opinion is similar to Cartwright J.'s. Hall J. dissented in a brief
opinion which also never considered the question whether natural justice
required a hearing at a preliminary as well as a later stage in the proceedings. 154
The remaining two cases which I have selected for discussion concern
the content of the rules of natural justice. It is clear that, speaking generally,
an opportunity to be heard involves disclosing to the party affected any
evidence adverse to him and giving him an opportunity to correct or contradict
such evidence. Does natural justice also require that the party affected be
given an opportunity to test adverse evidence by cross-examination?
In Mehr v. Law Society of Upper Canada55 a resolution by the Benchers
of the Law Society striking Mehr off the rolls was quashed for breach of natural
justice. Mehr was charged with failing to account for a sum of money received
by him on behalf of two clients. Mehr said that he had retained the money in
partial satisfaction of an agreed fee owed to him by the clients, and that he
had written to the clients advising them of his receipt of the money and of his
reason for retaining it. The clients made a sworn joint declaration in which
they denied having agreed to pay Mehr a fee, and denied having received any
letter from him after his receipt of the money. The discipline committee of
the Law Society had this declaration before them, but they never provided
Mehr with an opportunity to cross-examine the clients. In its report to the
152 Id., at 16.
153 Id., at 17.
154 Id., at 19.
155 [1955] S.C.R. 344.
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Benchers the committee rejected Mehr's account of the facts in favour of the
clients' account. But the committee claimed that in reaching its decision it
had "not given any effect to these declarations because the [clients] were not
present in person and available for cross-examination". The Ontario High
Court and Court of Appeal each decided that the committee's statement that
it had excluded the joint declaration from consideration was sufficient to support
the committee's decision. The Supreme Court of Canada reversed. Cartwright I.
for the Court characterized the declaration as "evidence to contradict on a
vital point the defence which had been sworn to by [Mehr] ",156 and he pointed
out that the declaration could have had an unconscious effect on the decision
of 'the committee. Because it had never been tested by cross-examination, its
reception was "wrongful and fatal to the validity of the proceedings". 157
This decision seems to me to be correct. However, it is certainly no
triumph of judicial craftsmanship. Cartwright J. never explains by what rule
of law the reception of evidence is "wrongful"; he never even uses the term
"natural justice"; and he cites no authorities relevant to the cross-examination
point.
Mehr may be contrasted with Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Delmar Chemical
Ltd.15 8 in which a decision of the Commissioner of Patents was upheld over an
allegation of breach of natural justice. The Commissioner had statutory power
to grant a compulsory license for the manufacture of patented drugs, "unless
he sees good reason to the contrary". Hoffman held the patent for the drug
"librium". Delmar applied to the Commissioner for a licence to manufacture
it. Hoffman opposed the application on the ground that Delmar's production
facilities were inadequate to cope with the manufacture of the drug. Hoffman's
opposition was elaborated in a written statement filed with the Commissioner.
Delmar filed a statement in reply. Hoffman then requested either a full oral
hearing or the opportunity to cross-examine the president of Delmar on
Delmar's statement in reply. The Commissioner accepted Delmar's version
of the facts and granted the licence. He refused Hoffman's request to test
Delmar's evidence by cross-examination. The Supreme Court of Canada
refused to quash the Commissioner's decision. Martland J., who wrote the
opinion of the Court, did not find it necessary to decide whether or not the
rules of natural justice were applicable, because they were in any event
satisfied by the "ample opportunity" given to Hoffman "to present its case
in writing".1 59
According to Martland J.:160
[The Commissioner] was entitled to set the procedures, and he did so. It was for
him to decide whether or not the circumstances required an oral hearing, cross-
examination upon affidavits, or oral submissions. In my opinion, his decision not
to require any of these things cannot be considered to be a denial of natural justice
to [Hoffman].
156 Id., at 349.
157 Id.
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This result is of course the opposite one from that reached by the Court
in Mehr ten years earlier. It is also apparently inconsistent with another
of the Court's own prior decisions, namely, the labour board case of Toronto
Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co.,161 in which the Court had assumed
that cross-examination of controverted evidence was a necessary ingredient
of natural justice. The decision in Hoffman-LaRoche is also probably incon-
sistent with the well-known decision of the Privy Council in University of Ceylon
v. Fernando.162 How were these three prior decisions on the right to cross-
examine distinguished in Hoffman-La Roche? The answer is that they were not
even referred to by the Court.
My own view is that Hoffman-La Roche is wrongly decided. It seems to
me, on the present state of the authorities, that natural justice does afford
a right to cross-examine controverted evidence, at least where cross-
examination is requested, and where the evidence is of a kind which cross-
examination could test.163 However, it cannot be said that the law is clearly
settled. Robert F. Reid, for example, has argued for a narrower right, arising
when a "person's rights, reputation or status were, or were likely to be, in
jeopardy". 164 But if the law is still in doubt, it is nevertheless an inexcusable
defect in judicial technique for the Court to decide one way in Mehr and the
other way in Hoffman-La Roche and not to refer to the earlier case or offer
reasons for distinguishing it. In the former a person's rights, reputation or
status were in jeopardy, while in the latter only economic considerations
were in issue.165 In the former some oral evidence was admitted, while in the
latter there was no oral hearing at all.166 Either or both of these points could
be the crucial distinction. But in the absence of any real reasons by the
Court for the decision in either case the issue is left in unnecessary doubt.
Conclusions
In the early part of this article, discussing the proper role of the courts,
I argued for a policy of restraint in judicial review. By and large, it seems to me
that the Supreme Court of Canada has been restrained in the exercise of its
review function. The overall figures show that the agency wins more than
half the time. And - more significantly - analysis shows that the cases in
which the agency loses usually do have special features: either the agency is
well outside its allotted power (this is rare), or the agency action is an
unexpected use of its power, usually in conflict with a strong competing
civil libertarian value. One gets the impression that a serious injustice would
never go unredressed in the Supreme Court of Canada, and that its decisions
are given in complete independence of the government which appoints the
judges and of other governments or groups. In short the decisions given by
the Court are generally consistent with my own theory as to the proper role
of the Court.
161 [19531 2 S.C.R. 18.
162 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223.
163 This view is expounded in P. Brett and P. W. Hogg, supra, note 32 at 501-503.
164 R. F. Reid, supra, note 28 at 81.
165 Id.
166 See P. Brett and P. W. Hogg, supra, note 32 at 503.
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But, if the Court's instinct for the proper result in each case is usually
sound (as I believe it is), its reasons for judgment are often woefully inade-
quate. First of all, it is very rare to find the Court enunciating the grounds
for what I detect as its tendency towards restraint in review; since there are
excellent policy reasons for this tendency it is a pity that they so seldom
appear in the reports. Secondly, the Court occasionally does not state the
legal rule upon which its decision is based, or (as in the delegation and natural
justice cases) it states the rule in terms of meaningless formulae such as the
classification of functions. Thirdly, the Court commonly relies on a very
narrow base of source material: its own prior decisions, even when they are
clearly relevant, and even when they seem inconsistent with the instant
decision, are sometimes not referred to; the decisions of inferior courts and
of the courts of other jurisdictions are only sparsely referred to; the Canadian
periodical literature, which is quite rich in the area of administrative law
(thanks to Abel, Arthurs, Gordon, Laskin, Willis, and others), is never
referred to; other secondary sources, such as English texts (the two Canadian
texts both being very recent), are referred to very rarely. Fourthly, and I
suppose this is the inevitable result of the previous three points, the Court's
reasons for judgment tend to be brief and in some cases even perfunctory.
It is plain that the judges of the Supreme Court have viewed their role
in almost exclusively adjudicatory terms. They have been preoccupied with
the disposition of the particular case before them. This, obviously, is the
Court's primary task. But part of the task of administering justice according
to law is the enunciation of sound legal reasons for each decision. The absence
of such reasons does less than justice to the parties. And the absence of such
reasons means that the Court fails in an important secondary task, which is
to clarify and synthesize the law affecting the cases which come before it.
As Reid's recent textbook so amply demonstrates, the state of Canadian
administrative law is lamentable. 167 The Supreme Court of Canada by reason
of its position at the head of the hierarchy of courts, could help to reconcile
the conflicting doctrine and dicta. Instead, I believe that on balance it has
added to the confusion. It has produced apparently inconsistent decisions
of its own, and it has failed to provide guidance to the lower courts, the
agencies or the lawyers. For example, the Court has wisely eschewed the
technical procedural snares which have disfigured the administrative law of
other jurisdictions, but it has never openly repudiated in general terms the
argument that the availability of an alternative remedy is ground for refusing
to grant an otherwise appropriate remedy. The Court has been inconsistent
in its approach to privative clauses, disregarding them in the immigration
and labour cases, and giving some effect to them in other kinds of cases.
Dicta offering a new approach to privative clauses by Rand, Judson and
Abbott JY. (and in the Australian courts) has been allowed to stand without
explicit rejection by a majority of the Court, even in decisions which seem
inconsistent with the dicta. The delegation cases provide no workable criteria
167R. F. Reid, supra, note 28 passim; see review in (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 663 criticizing the book's emphasis on the confusion in the law.
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as to when an agency may delegate and when it may not. The natural justice
cases present a particularly confused picture of apparently inconsistent deci-
sions, each one given with little or no reference to the others.
There are notable exceptions to the general tendency towards restraint
in review, perhaps because that tendency has never been clearly articulated
and supported with reasons. The jurisdictional fact doctrine has been used
as a device for reviewing the findings of labour relations boards, usually with
unfortunate results. The doctrine has only been used twice in the period of
study outside the labour relations area. This willingness in the labour field
to review findings which are peculiarly within the special competence of the
agency is not typical of the Court's work, which is usually characterized by
restraint. Yet the existence of these islands of activism leaves in doubt the
extent to which agency findings can be treated as conclusive. The delegation
cases too must be treated as activist aberrations: delegations by agencies tend
to be upset with little or no examination of or sympathy for the agency's
reasons for delegating.
In the absence of more information it would be speculative and pre-
sumptuous to offer reasons or remedies for the Court's failures in craftsman-
ship. Obviously, the heavy and diverse caseload which the Court carries
must be an important factor. And of course some opinions, especially some
of Rand and Judson JJ.'s, have been very good (though not necessarily
influential). 168 But, looking at the caselaw overall, I cannot escape the con-
clusion that the Supreme Court of Canada, despite its abundant wisdom and
commonsense, has not in the last 23 years made an important contribution
to the development of a coherent body of Canadian administrative law.169
168 E.g. Rand J. in Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R.
18 (dissenting opinion), in Smith and Rhuland Ltd. v. The Queen, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95, and
in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121; Judson J. in Jarvis v. Associated Medical
Services Inc., [1964] S.C.R. 497 (dissenting opinion), and in Wiswell v. Metropolitan
Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [1965] S.C.R. 512. Judson J.'s administrative law
opinions, in my respectful view, have been consistently good. Another excellent opinion
is that of Locke J. in Metropolitan Toronto v. Village of Forest Hill, [1957] S.C.R. 569
(dissenting opinion).
1691 am grateful to my colleague, Professor William Angus, who read this article
in draft form and made suggestions which enabled me to improve it.
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